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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E:llPLOYEES OF THE UTAH
FUEL COMPANY AT CLEAR
CREEK, UTAH,
Petitioners,
\S.

Case No. 6196

THE I~Dl:JSTRIAL COMMISSIOX OF "CTAH and UTAH
Fl!EL CO:llP.AXY, a corporation,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATE:llENT OF THE CASE.
This appeal involves certain proceedings taken and
decision made in administering the Unemployment Compensation Law of Utah, enacted at a Special Session of
the Legislature in 1936, as amended by the Legislature
in Regular Session of 1937. This particular incident
designated "Employees of Utah Fuel Company at
Clear Creek, Utah" is but one of a ~series of incidents
which came before the Industrial Commission of Utah
involving the right of workers to receive unemploySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment compensation benefits with relation to· weeks of
unemployment occurring during· the time that a strike
was in existence in the bituminous coal industry of Utah.
This rna tter in particular arises out of claims for
unemployment compensation benefits by some of the
Employees of the Utah Fuel Company who performed
services in its mine at Clear Creek, Uta·h, to whom we
shall hereinafter refer as Petitioners, with relation to a
peri·od of unemployment ranging from midnight May 4,
1939 to midnight May 18, 1939, which coincided in point
of time with the above referred to strike period.
T·he Utah Fuel Company, as the employer, appeared
in the proceedings before the Appeals Tribunal at a hearing held in Price, Utah, on July 6, 1939, is joined herein
as a defendant and will be hereinafter designated as
the Company.
The Industrial Commission of Utah will be designated as the Commi,ssion.
When the term "record" or "R'' is
reference to the file certified to this Court
mission, and the term ''transcript'' or '' T ''
transcript of hearing before the Appeals
Price, on July 6, 1939.

used it has
by the Comrefers to the
Tribunal at

On May 19, 1939, the Commission in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5(d) of the Utah
Unemployment Compensation Law (Chapter 43, Laws of
Utah, 1937) rendered a Deci,sion and Order relating to
the conditions under which a stoppage of work had
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

occurred, involving all workers and employers in the
bituminous coal industry of Utah, with the objective
in mind of determining whether or not all workers falling within the grade or elass involved would be disqualified fr01n receiving unemployment compensation
benefits during the period of unemployment resulting.
This Decision and Order was based upon an investigation carried on by the Commission and arrived at the
factual finding:
That the terms of employment existing in the bituminous coal industry throughout the United States, ineluding the State of "Gtah, have customarily been determined
by agreements entered into by and between a Union
representing the workers, the United Mine Workers of
.America, and the Coal Operators of the Appalachian
Area.
That rn accordance with such custom the workers
and the Coal Operators of Utah have refrained from
entering into agreements relating to the terms of employment in Utah, until the terms of an agreement in
the Central Competitive Area have been determined.
(Petitioners' Exhibit "B.'')
That in the year 1937, the United Mine Workers
of America and the Coal Operators of the Central Competitive Area, had entered into an agreement which was
to expire March 31, 1939 which, in general, fixed the
terms of the agreement governing employment conditions in the Utah bituminous coal industry except for
items of a local nature. (Petitioners' Exhibit "A.")
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The agreement entered into in Utah modified the
agreement affecting the Central Competitive Area in
that it provided for a continuation of the terms of the
agreement pending negotiations on a new contract. (Petioners' Exhibit" A," Sec. 103.)
That as the date for expiration of the contract
affecting the Central Competitive Area approached, national representatives of the workers met and attempted
to negotiate a new contract with the Appalachian Association of Coal Operators and because the contract of
the Central Competitive Area provided for termination,
endeavored to arrange an Interim Agreement whereby
the workers could· continue to perfo-rm services under
the terms of the old contract pending negotiations. The
Operators of the Appalachian Area refused to enter
into such an agreement and on April1, 1939, a stoppage
of work o-ccurred in the Appalachian Area.
In the State of Utah representatives of the workers,
the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 22,
and all of the Utah Coal Operators entered into an
agreement whereby the terms of Section 103 above
referred to were altered, providing for the continuation
of operations in the Utah bituminous coal industry subject to termination upon fifteen days' written notice.
(T. 11, 31, 32) (Petitioners' Exhibit "B.")
That as negotiations in the Central Competitive
Area apparently reached a deadlock the United Mine
Workers of America, District No. 22, upon orders from
the International Executive Board of the Union on April
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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19, 1939, issue-d a notice to the Coal Operators of Utah
that the Interim Agreement was to be terminated and
that a stoppage of work would be called on midnight
of May 4, 1939. (T. 11, 39)

The Commission, on June 12. 1939, fixed the period
of this stoppage of work as occu1-ring from midnig·ht
May 4, 1939 through midnight May 18, 1939. ( R. 24-25)
Based upon its above referred to finding·s, the Commission's I.kcision of May 19, 1939 rendered ineligible
for unemployment compensation benefits, those employees of the Coal Opera tors of U tab whose grade, or
class, or group of workers were totally or partially unemployed due to a stoppage of work at their respective
establishments, which existed because of the strike in
the bituminous coal industry. (R. 1-6}
On :May 25, 1939 a committee representing some of
the Employees of the Utah Fuel Company, who worked
at the mine located at Clear Creek, Utah, addressed a
letter to the Commission protesting, in effect, that the
unemployment of thirty-four employees had occurred
under such special circumstances that their ·stoppage of
work was not a result of the strike in the bituminous
coal industry but was the result of a temporary shutdown at the convenience of the Company. This protest
urged, in effect, that these employees were not of a group
•(}r class affected by the Decision of the Cominission
rendered May 19, 1939. (R. 7-9)
Following an investigation of the facts surrounding
the stoppage of work occurring at the mine at Clear
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Creek, Utah, the Unemployment Compensation Division
rendered a Decision dated June 20, 1939 that these workers were ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits during the strike period ranging from midnight May 4, 1939 to midnight May 18, 1939. (R. 26)
On June 22, 1939 the committee representing the
Petitioners, filed an appeal from thi~s Decision and requested a hearing. After due notice to all affected
parties a hearing was held July 6, 1939 at Price, Utah,
on a basis of which a Decision was rendered by the
Appeals Tribunal, dated July 11, 1939, holding that the
Petitioners' unemployment was not due to the strike
but due to the employer's convenience and that, therefore, such Petitioners were not ineligible to receive
unemployment compensation benefits. (Decision of Appeals Tribunal, R. 36-38.)
From this an appeal was filed by the Company
requesting a rehearing before the Commission. The
Request for Rehearing was denied but, based upon
all of the evidence adduced by the Appeals Tribunal, under authority of Section 6(c) (Chapter 43,
Laws of Utah, 1937) the Commission reversed the Deci,sion of the Appeals Tribunal and found that the Petitioners were disqualified from receiving unemployment
compensation benefits during the ~strike period. (Decision
of Commission, August 14, 1939, R. 43-46.)
Subsequently, a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Commission's Decision was filed by Petitioners and was
denied after the Commi·ssion had permitted the filing ·of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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briefs by the attorney for the Petitionefls and the attorney for the t~mpany. From this Decision arose the
Petition for "\Yrit of Review initiating this matter before
this Honorable Body.
ST.A.TEME~T

OF FACTS.

The Utah Fuel Company was a party to the above
referred to .Agreement existing between the United
Mine Workers of .America and the Utah Coal Operators -which was effective April 1, 1937 to :March 31, 1939.
(See p. 39 Petitioners' Exhibit "A.") In contemplation of its expiration a representative of the Union met
with the Coal Operators of Utah during the latter part
of March, 1939, and at that time entered into a Supplemental .Agreement whereby the terms of Section 103
were amended and the parties agreed that the terms of
the Wage .Agreement which was expiring March 31, 1939
were to remain in full force and effect after March 31,
1939 pending the negotiation of a new Wage Agreement
and whereby the parties agreed to negotiate a new Utah
Wage Agreement as sD'on as practicable after the negotiation of a Wage Agreement by the joint Appalachian
Conference. This Supplemental Agreement further provided that it could be terminated by either party upon
the serving of a fifteen days' written notice. (T. 11, 31,
32, Petitioners' Exhibit "B.")
On April 19, 1939 the Petitioners, through their
Union, notified the Utah Co-al Operators including the
Company that the Interim Agreement would terminate
at midnight May 4, 1939. (T. 11, 39)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In contemplation of the stoppage of work which was
to result three steps were taken by the Company :

First: Those workers 1performing <Services on the
night shift which worked fro-m 7 :00 p. m., May 3, to 2 :00
a. m., May 4, 1939, were directed at the end of their
S'hift not to return to work on their next shift which
would have commenced 7 :00 p. m., May 4, 1939. (T. 11,
12, 22-29) It was customary for the miners on the night
shift to merely mine and load the coal and leave it for
the day shift to transport out of the mine. (T. 18)
The Company, not desiring to have mined coal left in
the mine during the contemplated strike, did not deem
it convenient to have the night shift work a short shift
which would have ended 12 :00 midnight, May 4, 1939. (T.
55-57)

Second: The employer developed plans for the carrying on ·of nonproductive construction and development
work during the contemplated cessation of work. (T.
40, 41) These plans carried out rproposed construction
work in the mine which the Company had for some
time previously contemplated and whieh it had planned
to· carry out in the slack season which generally occurred
in the summer months. ( T. 45)
The construction work was to consist of remodeling
of the tipple, the building of outside buildings, the installation of a rotary dump and belt conveyor, and
loading rock out of and laying track in an old entry
preparatory to the opening up of a new area in the mine.
These extensive alterations and developments arose out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the fact that the amount of coal to be mined out of
the developed portions of the mine was eonsiderably
redneed. ( T. 6, 7, 43, 50, 59)
Accordingly, a representative of the Company contacted the Union on May 4, 1939, and requested the
Union to give its consent to the performance of the
above desc.ribed construc.tion work during the suspension
of c.oal mining operations. (T. 5, 6, 40) On May 8, 1939,
the Union gave its consent and the Company c.ommenced
its nonproductive activities on approximately May 9,
1939. (T. 11, 12, 18, 22)
Third: The Company omitted the posting of a
"work sign" whic.h was one of the c.ustomary methods
of advising workers that the Company desired them
to work. (T. 49)
On May 11, 1939, a Tentative Agreement was
reached in the Central Competitive Area by the United
Mine Workers of Americ.a and the Coal Operators in
the Appalachian Area. Notice of this Tentative Agreement reached District No. 22 of the Union which in turn
was submitted for approval by the Coal Operators of
Uta:h on the ·same day. (T. 34-38) The Coal Operator·s
of Utah approved the Tentative Agreement and submitted to and notified District No. 22 of the United Mine
Workers of America of such approval on May 18, 1939.
(T. 44)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In their brief the Petitioners, in effect, urge that the
Decision of the Commission denying benefits is contrary
to law and should be annulled. They contend:
(1) T·hat there is no evidence to show that the
Petitioners were totally unemployed due to
a stoppage of work which existed because of
a strike;
(2) That if a strike existed in the coal mining
industry there is no evidence to show that it
was the cause or reason that the Petitioners
became unemployed during the strike period;
(3) That the Petitioners were unemployed due to
the fact that the Company did not have work
available fo-r them during the strike period.
The defendants take the position, however, that the
Decision of the Commission denying benefits to the
Petitioners is correct.

The defendants contend:

1. That the question of whether or not there
was a strike in existence was not an issue
in the hearing before the Commis·sion and
cannot be made one of the issues in this proceeding;
2. That the only issue raised in the hearing before the Commission was whether or not these
Petitioners were of the grade or class of
workers affected by the Decision of the Commis·sion rendered May 19, 1939, relative to the
~strike existing in the bituminous coal industry of Utah;
3. That these Petitioners were of the grade or
·class of workers affected by the Decision of
the Commission dated May 19, 1939 due to
the fact that their unemployment du~ing the
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strike period did not arise out of n lack
of work at the conYeuienoe of the employer.
AR.GUMENT.

I.
THE QUESTION OF WHETHEH OR NOT THERE WAS A STRIKE
IN EXISTEXCE AFFECTIXG EITHER THE BITUMINOUS
COAL IXDUSTRY GENERALLY OR THE COMPANY MAY
XOT PROPERLY BE COXSIDERED AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS
COURT.

A. The only issue broug-ht before the Commission
by the Petitioners was whether or not the conditions of their unemployment were such as to
remo\e them from the purview of the Decision
of the Commission rendered :May 19, 1939, relati\e to the coal industry strike.

In their brief the Petitioners assert that the Findings of Fact in the Commission's May 19th Decision
cannot be taken into consideration by this court in
rendering its decision in this matter arguing that this
is true because no evidence was submitted by either
party before the Appeals Tribunal relative to- the facts
found therein.

It is urged by them that the question of whether or
not the Petitioners were on a strike may not have been
properly decided as a result of proceedings from which
this appeal is taken. (Petitioner's Brief pp. 5, 10, 22)
We agree. The hearing before the Appeals Tribunal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and the Deci,sion of the Appeals Tribunal as affirmed
by the Commission were concerned with only one question: Were the workers performing services at the
Clear Creek Mine of the Company separated from their
employment because the Company desired to remodel its
mine or because of a stoppage of work which existed
because of a strike in the bituminous coal industry~
A review of the procedure required by the Utah
Unemployment Compensation Law when claims are filed
by unemployed individuals who may he disqualified from
the receipt of benefits because of a stoppage of work
due to a strike, will clearly reveal the scope of such
hearing and decisions. (Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1937.)
Section 5(d) .provides, among other things, that an
individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for the purpose of estabHshing a waiting period:
" (d) For any week in which it is found by the
commission that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a strike involving his grade, class,
or group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he i~s or was last employed.
'' ( 1) If the commission, upon investigation, shall
find that a strike has been fomented by a worker
of any employer, none of the workers of the grade,
dass, or group of workers of the individual who
is found to be a party to such plan, or agreement
to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits;
provided, however, that if the commission, upon
investigation, shall find that such strike is caused
by the failure or refusal of any employer to conform to the provisions of any law of the state of
Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wages, or other conditions of work. such strike
shall not render the workers ineligible for benefits.
"(2) If the commission, upon investig·ation, shall
find that the employer, his agent, or representative, has conspired. planned, or agreed with any
of his workers, their agents, or representatives
to foment a strike, such strike shall not render
the workers ineligible for benefits.''
Accordingly, when the Commission was apprized of
the existence of a stoppage of work in the bituminous
coal industry of Utah involving all miners falling within
the purview of an Agreement existing between the Coal
Operators of Utah and United Mine Workers of America,
District X o. 22, it became its duty to determine whether
or not such stoppage of work existed because of such
strike and whether or not such strike had been fomented
by a worker of such grade, class, or group of workers
involved. (Petitioners' Exhibit "A.")
The procedure followed by the Commission in
making such determinations was that set forth in Section
6, Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1937, which provides among
other things, that:
'' (b) . . . in any case in which the payment or
denial of benefits will be determined by the provisions of section 5(d) of this act, the deputy
shall promptly transmit his full findings of fact
with respect to- that subsection to the ·commission
which on the basis of evidence submitted and such
additional evidence as it may require, shall affirm,
modify, or set aside such findings of fact, and
transmit to the deputy a decision upon the iHsues
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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involved under that subsection which shall be
deemed to be the decision of the deputy. . . "
The Commission, through its deputy, made an investigation of the circumstances surrounding the stoppage of work existing in the bituminous coal industry.
On May 19, 1939, without hearing, the Commi,ssion rendered a Decision which held, in effect, that the stoppage
of work existing in the bituminous coal industry of Utah
existed because of a strike fomented by the workers
and further held that the employees of the coal operators engaged in the production of coal in the State of
Utah whose grade, or class, or group of workers at their
respective establishments were totally or partially unemployed due to such stoppage of work, were ineligible
for benefits for such time as their total or partial unemployment was due to such stoppage of work. The
Decision did not relate to any particular mining company
nor to the Petitioners. The Decision, in accordance with
the provisions of Section 6 (b) above quoted, was deemed
to be the Decision of the Deputy who properly notified
all of the partie's, including the Petitioners. (R. 1-6)
On May 25, 1939, the Petitioners, through a committee, addressed a communication to the Commission
asserting in effect that the circumstances under which
t·he work of the Petitioners terminated were such that
their unmeployment, either total or partial, did not fall
within the purview of the May 19th Decision of the Commission. It did not question the propriety of the Commission's Deci,sion relative to the reasons for the stopSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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page of work, i. e.. a strike fomented by the workers.
(R. 7-9)

An investigation was conducted by the Commission
as to the reasons for the stoppage of work at the Clear
Creek mine of the Company "ith the objective of learning whether or not such stoppage arose out of the desire
of the Company to remodel its mine. This investigation
culminated in a decision dated J nne 20, 1939 which held,
in effect. that the Petitioners were ineligible to receive
unemployment compensation benefits during the strike
period May 5. 1939 to May 18, 1939, inclusive. In other
words, the Petitioners in this Decision were found to be
of the grade, class, or group of workers involved in the
stoppage of work which existed because of the strike in
the bituminous coal industry. (R. 26) From this Decision the Petitioners filed an appeal on June 22, 1939.
(R. 27) Again, it is pointed out that there was no
appeal from the May 19th Decision of the Commission. As a result ·of this appeal the hearing on
July 6, 1939, was held. This hearing was concerned
solely with the question of whether or not the petitioners' unemployment was the result of a cessation of
employment because of the Company's desire to remodel
its plant.
The opening and closing discussions appearing in
the transcript of the hearing forcibly brought out the
issues with which the parties were concerned:
''THE EXAMINER: We will let the record
show that claims have been filed by the employee-s
of the Utah Fuel Company working at the mine
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
at Clear Creek, Utah for unemployment compensation benefits, and that between the dates beginning midnight May 4, 1939 and ending May 18,
1939 the Benefit Section of the Unemployment
Compensation Division disqualified these men on
the ground that they refused to accept employment when offered and that such refusal was due
to a strike which existed at the coal mine. The
claims of the men in filing their appeal with the
Appeals Tribunal are to the effect that they were
available for the work that was being done at the
coal mine, and at that time the tipple was being
remodeled, and I guess it is probably going to be
the claim of the men that no suitable employment was available to them and that the posting
of the work sign by the company was not done
in good faith. Is that true~
''MR. GIBSON: No. We claim that no work
sign was posted.
''THE EXAMINER: In view of the fact
that an appeal was filed by the employees, we ask
that the employees present their evidence first.
''MR. GIBSON: Let me ask a question right
here. Maybe we can shorten the matter. The
question of the statement, on the ground for refusal is the only question involved, isn't it~ In
other words, is the Utah Fuel Company making
any other claim other than the one stated by Mr.
Atkin~

"MR. BINCH: The position of the Utah
Fuel Company is that on April nineteenth we received notice t·hat the contract existing between
the coal operators and the United J\1.ine Workers
would terminate on midnight on May fourth and
that no additional work would be done under that
union contract until some further agreement had
been entered into. And that on the fifth the men
were not at work simply because they had chosen
to stay away.
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••THE EXAMINER: Yon nrc, however, taking the position, Mr. Binrh. that work was available to the men if thev eared to return to the work
at the coal mine.
•
"'MR. BIXCH: No. "\York would have been
available if they had wanted to dig· coal, but
it was not available to all of them for this outside activity.
"THE EXAMIXER: "\Yell, that is what I
am referring to-the prOtiuction of coal. vV ork
would ha\e been available to them.
"'MR. BINCH: I don't know that it is material what our attitude in that case would be.
The mine recei\ed notice that they would terminate their contract and would not work. What
our attitude might have been after that doesn't
enter the picture as I see it.

"MR. GIBSON: Well, the reason I asked
the question is, I didn't want to introduce a lot of
evidence to prove something that might not be
in the contro\ersy.
''THE EXAMINER:

Surely.

"MR. GIBSON: I think I understand the
matter now. There isn't any contention between
us other than the reason the men didn't work
was because of the termination of the contract
and the notice that you have described." (T. 2, 3)

*

*

''THE EXAMINER: And go in to it a little
more thoroughly to establish whether work was
available or not. In other words, if there had
existed any disagreement between the operators
and the miners, was work available in that event~
and was the stoppage of work due to the refusal
of the men to go to work or was it due to the
company's inability to operate the mine~
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"MR. BINCH: I will state here, I don't
intend to offer any evidence as to the rela~ion
ship between the sales department and the mines.
We are going to stand on that notification that
they weren't going to work.
''THE EXAMINER: I see. All right then,
we will consider the hearing closed, and we will
mail a written decision to the interested parties."
(T. 68, 69)

*

*
*
*
*
*
*
''THE EXAMINER: Just a moment, Mr.
Binch. Would the parties be willing to enter
into a stipulation that in the event that the special
circumstances surrounding the unemployment of
these claimants as claimed by the representative
of claimants, do not apply, would it be agreeable
to bind both of the parties by the facts submitted, the evidence submitted in the large hearing in which Mr. Senior is representing the Utah
Coal Producers Ass,oeiation and Mr. Gibson is
representing the United Mine Workers. In that
hearing, of course, we will go into that question
completely, why the stoppage of work, what was
the reason for the stoppage of work, and oonnect
it up with the Appalachian agreement or negotiations in the Appalachian Area.
"MR. BINCH: That will be quite all right
with me.
"THE EXAMINER: That is agreeable to
you?
''MR. GIBSON: In t,his case, Mr. Atkin, I
believe it is such a special case, I don't see how
it could be decided by the other one. Of course,
I see if you decide against these men on this, they
have the other legal question which would be
decided in the main one. I am willing to go part
way. I don't want to be prejudiced in this case.
Suppose you decide against us on this case, I
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want to appeal on tlw merits of this ensC' alone
and not he bound by the facts of this other cas(_~,
because I believe I have a reeord here that entitles
these men to compensation, and I don't ·want to
take a chance of hurting my record by some other
mine. It is all right with me that no appeal be
taken until the other case is decided, but of
course I don't want to be prejudiced by the time
of the appeal running.

•·MR. BIXCH: I didn't get that.
··MR. GIBSOX: 'Yell, suppose they decide
this ease no\\ and decide it against us, my time
for appeal starts to run.
'':MR. BIXCH: Yes.
'':MR. GIBSON: All right, suppose they
don't decide the other case for sometime, and you
want me to wait on this case to appeal it until
the other one is decided. My time for appeal
will expire before the other one is decided. I will
be willing to wait provided you will stipulate that
the time for appeal doesn't begin to run until that
case is decided." (Italics are ours.) (T. 69, 70)
At no time during the hearing was an issue made
of the propriety of the Commission's Decision of May
19, 1939, that the stoppage of work existing in the bituminous coal industry was the result of a strike fomented
by the workers.
This is borne out by the fact that the Decision of
the Appeals Tribunal, rendered July 11, 1939, subsequent
to the above referred to hearing, came to the conclusion
that:
" . . . the unemployment of the claimants
herein involved was due to a lack of suitable emSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ployment, which condition was not brought into
existence by or which had any connection with a
stoppage of work due to a strike at X Company's
coal mine at Clear Creek, Utah, within the meaning of section 5 (d) of the U tab Unemployment
Compensation Law.'' (R. 36-38)
Upon an appeal by the Company from the Decision
,o.f the Appeals Tribunal the Commission rendered its
Decision of August 14, 1939, in which the scope of the
decision was limited again to the question of whether
or not the petitioners' unemployment arose under such
circumstances as to take them out of the purview of the
decisions of the CommissiCl,n relative to the general strike
situation dated May 19, 1939 and June 22, 1939, respectively.
We quote the following language:
''From the facts submitted in this case it appears
quite clearly that the X Company would not have
con1menced its repair and alteration activities
until later in the summer. On the contrary, it
appears quite clearly that repairs and alterations
occurring in the mine from May 9 to May 18 and
thereafter, were of a nature that had the stoppage ,of work terminated, the Mining Company
could quite readily have commenced operations
in the regular production of coal, in fact, it appears that until tipple repairs were commenced
approximately one month after May 9 the mine
did not require any great time in which to resume
the normal production -of coal. \V e do not believe
that this constitutes a circumstance taking these
claims out of the scope of the determinations of
May 22 and June 17, relative to the general strike
situation in the bituminous coal industry.'' (R.
43-46)
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It is even doubtful that the petitioners in their
Petition for 'Yrit of Re\iew. filed before this Honorable
Body, clearly raised the issue of whether or not the
stoppage of work existing in the bituminous coal industry was a result of a strike fomented by the workers.
The issue does not become clearly stated until the Brief
of PetitiDners was filed. Even t,here, the Brief of Petitioners does not particularly raise the issue of whether
or not there is a strike but questions the propriety
of this c.ourt to renew the Findings of Fact of the
Commission in the D€cision of May 19, 1939, issued
by the Commission relative to the strike. It is
our contention that the court should limit the scope
of its review of this proceeding to the issue of: Whether
or not the circumstances under which the unemployment
of the petitioners occurred were such as to remove them
from the purview of the Commission's strike decision.
Our position is in accord with such a widely accepted
tenet of law that extensive argument on the point appears unnecessary. Generally speaking, the parties may
not alter the issues or theory of a case upon appeal to the
reviewing court. They must, remain within the issues
raised in the lower court and upon which evidence was
adduced.
In the case ·of Wihite Company v. Bragg, 273 S. W.
7, the Supreme Court of Arkansas refused to permit the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
plaintiff to introduce a new issue upon which it sought to
reverse the Trial Court and said:
''This question was not made an issue in the Trial
Court by the pleadings, testimony and instructions of ·the Court. It is well settled in this State
that a party cannot on appeal contend for a theory
of the case different from that which it contended
for in the Trial Court.''
In the case of Western Indemnity Company v. State
Industrial Commission, 219 P. 147, Supreme Court of
Oklahoma, said with reference to the same principle:
''Where a party tries his case upon one theory
in the Trial Court, he will not be permitted to
ehange in this Court and prevail upon another
theory and issue not presented to the Trial Court."
See also Southern Insuramce Company v. Hastings, 41
S. W. 1093; Shi!WJ~ v. Plott Newport & Co., 101 S. W. 742
(Ark.); Newsome v. Fleming, 181 S. E. 393.
This principle of law has been quite universally applied to cases invo.lving appeals from de-cisions made by
administrative tribunals to a court of review.
In the case of Ujeviah v. Inspiration Consolidaled
Copper Co., 33 P. (2d) 599, the Supreme Court of Arizo.na refused to permit the appellant to raise an issue before it which he had failed to raise before the Commission in a workmen's compensation case. The Court said:
''In his motion for rehearing :he made no such
.complaint. In fact, the record shows he seemed
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to acquiesce in the method pursued. This point
having not been urged before the Commission
romes too late."
So too, the Supreme C()urt of Michigan in another workmen's eompensation case, Doherty v. Grosse Isle TP, 172
N. W. 596, said:
"The daim that Doherty was a casual employee
was concededly not properly raised before the Accident Board nor passed upon by it.
. the
question of ea.sual employment is not properly
here for review
''
See also Burmester
Appeals, New York.

L

DeLucia, 189 N. E. 231, Court of

This principle has been followed in Utah with relation to matters arising under the Workmen '·s Compensation Law before the Industrial Commission of Utah. It
is not as strictly applied in proceedings arising from administrative tribunals as from trial courts, but nevertheless, generally speaking, parties cannot present one
set of issues before an administrative tribunal a.nd later
ask for a reversal of the tribunal's decision upon the basis
of some new issue.
This Court in the case of Stanley v. Industrial Com-

mission of Utah, 8 P. (2d) 770, said:
"Rule that pertains to the Courts to the effect that
parties cannot try a case on one theory and then
attempt to gain a reversal upon some other theory
on appeal not advanced on the trial should not be
applied as stri-ctly to the Industrial Commission,
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especially if the parties were honest and were not
experimenting with the Tribunal, since the Industrial ·Commission has a duty to determine
whether the 0onditions precedent exist w.hich entitle an applicant to payment, regardless of
theories advanced by counsel.''
The immediate case, however, does not even fall
within the purview ·of the above quoted liberal opiniorn
of the ·court. It should 1be noted that the issue of whether
or not the stoppage ·Of work \Vas due to a strike was
known to be in existence to all of the parties, including
the Petitioners, and that there was an intentional rather
than an inadvertent failure to pursue su~h issue in the
hearing before the Appeals Tribunal. There is no doubt
that the above referred to principle of law should prevent
the raising of this new issue by the Petitioners even
though this is an appeal from an administrative tribunal.
Unless the court accedes to this viewpoint it would
find itself in the position ·of rendering a decision upon
the issue of whether or not the stoppage of work was due
to a strike fomented by the workers without sufficient
evidence because, as a matter of fact, in this proceeding
there was no thorough investigation of the reasons for
the stoppage ·Of work existing in t:he bituminous coal industry or for that matter of the reasons for the stoppage
of w·ork at the ·Clear ·Creek mine of the Company.
The Commission had fulfilled its duty with reference
to determining whether or not payments should be made
out of the Unemployment Compensation Fund to all
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wDrkers inYolved in the stoppagp of work by rendering
a separate decision after n separate investigation on
May 19, E)39.

II.
THE

COMMISSION

REASONABLY

CIRCUMSTANCES

UNDER

CONCLUDED

WHICH

THE

THAT

THE

PETITIONERS'

LNEMPLOYMENT OCCURRED WERE NOT SUCH AS TO
REMOVE THEM FROM THE PURVIEW OF ITS GENERAL
STRIKE DECISIONS OF MAY 19, 1939, AND JUNE 22, 1939.

In determining whether or not any claimant for benefits must be considered as disqualified

be~ause

the cir-

cumstances surrounding his unemployment fall within the
purview of Section 5(d) aho\e quoted, it is essential that
the Commission satisfy- itself as to two points:
(1)

Was there a stoppage of work in existence
at the worker's establishment due to a strike
fomented by and involving his grade, class,
or group of workers?

(2)

Was the claimant's unemployment due to
such stoppage of work¥

As urged by us above, point No. 1 was determined by the

Commission in another proceeding not here under review and with relation to all the workers and operators
of the bituminous coal industry of Utah.

The circum-

stances under which petitioners' employment terminated
will determine point No. 2.
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Were they such that the Commission should reasonably have found that Petitioners' unemployment was
traceable to some ·other cause? What caused the Company to cease operations at the Clear Creek mine? Was
it a desire. to remodel its mine?
A review of the evidence indicates that during the
period immediately preceding May 4, 1939, it was carrying on mining operations very much as usual for that
time of the year. Although the Company generally fa.ced
a decrease in the volume of its business during the summer months; it was continually receiving and anticipating sufficient -orders to have pr·oduced some coal during
this period. (T. 50-53) 'There is no testimony which indicates that the Company would have closed its
mine on May 4, 19•39, because of lack of business. As a
matter of fact, it appears that the contrary was true; that
customers of the Con1pany advised ·O.f the contemplated
stoppage of work, due to a strike, were notified that no
orders could be filled during its existence. (T. 48, 49)
The facts are that the first step taken, which culminated in the stoppage of coal pr·oduction at the Clear
Creek mine, was taken by the workers in the form of a
notice that the Interim Agreement (Petitioners' Exhibit
'' B '') would be cancelled. That notice caused a cessation
of productive work on midnight May 4, 1939. (T. 11)
The facts thus far recited justify the ·Commission's
decision that the unemployment .of the petitioners did not
arise from circumstances other than the strike.
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The actions of the Company, after not ifi{•a tion that
work would cease on May 4, 1n3~l, quite dearly are the
actions which the Petitioners are now urging as the causes
f-or the stoppage of work. The Company's first act was
to bring to fruition a plan of nonproductive work such
as remodeling and extension of the mine during the contemplated stoppage of work period. On May 4, 1939 it
met with a Union official seeking his consent to perform
such nonproductive work and to use its former workers
if possible. Only after such permission· was given by the
representative of the Petitioners on May 8, 19·39, did the
Company actually commence operations.
Does the fact that an employing unit seeks to continue operations, not in conflict with the desires of the
striking workers, constitute a factor which removes the
workers from the purview of Section 5(d) of the Utah
Unemployment Compensation Law~ We think not. Section 5(d) is concerned with the reasons for the termination of the workers' employment.
A close analogy to the factors decisive ·of this question would be the tort theory of ''Proximate Causa tiDn. ''
The Company's desire to. remodel its plant does not alter
the fact that the "proximate cause" of the Petitioners'
unemployment was their desire to forward the negotiation of a work agreement favorable to. themselves.
It was urged by the Petitioners that the Clear Creek
mine could not :have operated because there was a lack
of coal. The evidence clearly indicates that such was not
the case. (T. 43, 50, 59, 66) The testimony was that the
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Clear Creek mine was ·ornly "sixty per cent worked out,"
so that if a stoppage of work had not existed the said
Clear Creek mine could have and would have operated.
Inquiry as to the .character of such nonproductive
enterprise, with the ·nbjective of determining whether or
not such nonpr·oductive enterprises would have prevented
a return to a production of coal, clearly indicates that it
was not ne·cessary to stop coal production while doing
the development work. (T. 43, 66) As a matter of fact, the
only alteration of the Company's equipment which could
have prevented pr·oduction was an alteration of the tipple
which did not occur until approximately thirty days after
the stoppage of work ·commenced. (T. 51, 66)
T:he decision ·of the· Company to engage in such nonpr·oductive work could not reasonably have been considered an indication that it desired to terminate operations at the Clear Creek mine. The testim.ony adduced at
the hearing indicates that the decisi·on to stop production
of coal was not made at the time that the decision to do
development work was made. ( T. 46, 65, 66) The development work had been contemplated several months previous to May 4, 1939, and was planned to take place sometime during the summer months.
As a matter of fact, the 'Company did not even

con~

template commencing nonproductive work until it had
met with representatives of the Petitioners and had secured their consent to carry ·on such activities during the
strike period. (T. 5, 6, 8, 1·5, 16)
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The Petitioners additionally urged that once the
Company determined upon a course .of nonproductive
work and made such work available to some workers at
the Cl-ear Creek mine the workers not offered sueh employment became immediately eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. They seemed to have
reasoned that there was an insufficiency of "suitable"
employment offered. This reasoning is based upon a distortion of th-e facts in order to prevent the disqualification of the workers under the provisions of Section 5(d)
(Chapter 43, Laws of rtah, 1937) and to make it appear
that the Petitioners may not be disqualified because of
the ·pronsions of .Section 5 (c) which bases disqualification upon the refusal of workers to ac.cept '~ suitruble
w<>rk" when offered. They, in effect, urge that work at
the Clear Creek mine looking to the production of coal
was "unsuitable" within the provisions of Section 5 (c)
(2) which provides that:
"(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this act, no work shall be deemed suitable, and
benefits shall not be denied under this act to any
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (a) If the position offered is vacant due
directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor disputes ; * * ~ "
It appears to be the Petitioners' position that the

only "suitable work'' was the nonproductive employment
engaged in by the Oo.mpany and that the Company was
offering an insufficient amount of such work. The posiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion taken by the Petitioners, if acceded to, would constitute an evasion of the provisions of Section 5(d). The
employment of the Petitioners was in existence prior to
May 4, 1939; their work was the production of coal. The
Petitiom.ers ended that employment by issuing a notitee
that effective May 4, 1939, they would abrogate the Interim Agreement. (Petitioners' EX'hibit "B.")
Certainly, the nonproductive work that the Company
offered was "suitable" within the purview of Section
5 (c) of the Law but it was not the ·only "suitable work"
offered. Production ·Of coal was refused by the workers
and the circumstances under which they refused it were
the same circumstances which caused it to. become "unsuitable" in the eyes of Petitioners. If so deemed, all
work refused by strikers would have to be considered
"unsuitable" and, therefore, all strikers could claim
benefits because they had not been offered "suitable"
employment.
Section 5(c) was intended to render "unsuitable,''
work available due· to a strike only with relationship to
workers not of the striking group or class, and Section
5( c) shoruld not be .considered the section applicable to
the determination .of the benefit rights of these Petitioners. It, therefore, seems to be obvious that the Company need not have been in a position to offer nonproductive work to all of the workers at the Clear Creek
mine in order to have continued their disqualification
from bene-fits with'in the purview ·of the strike decision
of the Commis-sion dated May 19, 1939.
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Petitioners assert n fu1iher g-round whereby the
workers must be deemed clig-iblt"' t{) l'l'<.'l"'iYc unemployment compensation benefits during· tlw ~trike ,•period.
They state at Page 10 (Brief of Petitioners) :
., The Ftah Fuel Company dtW8 not cn'n elaim
that the mine "·ould haYe worked so nnwh that
the men would not haYe been entitled to partial
unemployment compensation as is the effed of
the present decision of the commission.''
Is it necessary~ to the disqualification of 1.vorkers
"Whose unemployment is due t.o a stoppage of work resulting from a strike, that the Commission find that the
"Workers would haYe •been totally employed by the employing unit if the stoppage of work had not

occurred~

We call your attention to the language of Section
5(d) pronding that an individual shall be ineligible for
benefits.

Such disqualification applies:

"(d) For any week in which it is found by the
commission that his total or partial unemployment
is due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a strike involving his grade, class, or
group of workers * * *. '' (Italics are ours.)
Even if the evidence unquestionably indicates that the
mine would have worked only one day in each of the
weeks involved in the strike period the Petitioners would
have been disqualified' from the receipt of unemployment
compensation benefits for the entire period.

If their

partial unemployment is due to the stoppage of work it
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is sufficient. The language .of the law is so clear that
further argument would be useless.
Petitioners make much of the fact that t:he Company
omitted to post ·'"work signs'' o·r in any other manner
advise the Petitioners to work during the strike period.
At page 8 (Brief of Petitioners) they urge:
''The defendant's superintendent in Clear Creek
testified on cr.oss examination that the men were
not asked at any time to work and did not at any
time refuse to work.''
On Page 10 (Brief of Petitioners) they assert:
''All of the evidenc.e submitted by ho.th sides shows
that no offer of work during the period in question was made to the petitioners and that tbey did
not refuse to accept any wo.rk and could not have
refused because none was offered.''
And, ·On Page 13 (Brief of Petitioners) they contend:
''The evidence is conelusive that no work sign
was put ·OUt notifying the men to ·Come to work
at any time after May 4 as had he en the custom
of the company.''
This argument appears t·n be making considerable
of a mere technicality and fails to face the reality of the
facts presented in the evidence, i.e., that tlhe men took
the initiative and notified the ·Company that there would
be no work after May 4. In fact, Petitioners' argument
if f.oHowed, would result in a requirement that the Company refuse to

reco~gnize

the workers' right to strike and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

......

t.h)

would in fact require the Company to mnke an effort to
work its nline in opposition to the workers' desire to.
create a stoppage of work as a method of furthering any
collecti\e bargaining on which they may embark.
P~rha·ps the best reply that can be made to this assei1ion of the Petitioners was that given by Mr. Bryson,
a witness f.or the Company, to the question:
posted~

"Q.

\\hy wasn't it

''A.

\\ e accepted the official notice of the mine
workers at its face value and felt that it
would be technical and useless and not in
good faith to post it." (T. 49)

It is disclosed by the evidence that a portion of the
Petitioners were employed on the night shift which shift
commenced at 7:00p.m. and ended 2:00a.m. of the following morning. As has !been previously pointed out,
the night shift was engaged entirely in the mining of coal
but would leave its transportation out of the mine to the
following shift. Consequently, when the Company was
advised that a stoppage of work was to ·occur, effective
midnight of 1Iay 4, it notified the men <m the night shift
that they would not be required to work at the next shift.
The Company did not deem it advisable to have
this shift work a short shift ending at midnight May 4,

because it did not want its coal left in the mine during
the proposed strike period. ('T. 55-57)
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vance of the time set by t:he Union for the general stoppage of work, a circumstance which would remove such
portion of the claimants ·out ·Of the purvimv of the Commission's strike decision of May 19?
If we may be penni tted to again use the terminology
''proximate cause'' and our analogy to that tort doctrine
it appears to be quite clear that the unemployment of
such claimants was still a result of the stoppage of work
due to the· strike.
The determination of t:1e Compa·ny to suit its convenience as to the time of the cessation of their work
with respect to the time of the proposed stoppage ·Of work
was not the "proximate cause'' of their unemployment.
In fact, the termination of their employment at 2 :00 a.m.
on the morning of May 4, 1939 was as much a result of
the strike notice as the termination of t1he later shift at
3 o'clock p. m., that day. The mere matter of a few hours
should not be oonsidered as altering the reason for such
termination. 'To follow any other reasoning would result i·n denying to an employing unit a. reasonable opportunity to arrange the affairs of its business to eomply
with the very thing desired by its striking workers-a
complete cessation .of w·ork during the bargaining period.
\Vhen the Utah law refers to unemployment which
is due to a stoppage of work it does not limit such unemployment to that which ooincides with the time .of the
stoppage of work; it merely seeks to identify the unemployment in terms of its causa;tion. The in1portant quesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion is not: "\Yhen did thP unemployment Ol'C.nr'?-lmt
Why did the unemployment

OC('Ur'!

It is our position that the

nnemploymt~nt

of the Peti-

tioners on the night shift was a result of the stoppag-e
of work found to exist by the strike decision of the Commission dated May 19, 1939.

III.
EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE STOPPAGE
OF WORK WAS

I~

E..."TISTENCE BECAUSE OF A STRIKE

FOMEXTED BY THE WORKERS IS CONSIDERED THERE
IS

SUFFICIE~""T

EVIDE.J.'lCE TO SUSTAIN A FINDING BY

THE COMMISSIOX THAT THE STOPPAGE OF WORK WAS
DUE TO A STRIKE FOMEKTED BY THE WORKERS.

In determining whether or not Petitioners for benefits under the "Gtah unemployment compensa.tion law
should be disqualified because ·of the provisions of Section 5(d) above quoted, it booomes incumbent upon the
Commission to determine when the total or partial unemployment under oonsideration is due to a stoppage of
work:
(1)

Whether or not the stoppage of work is due
to a strike involving the grade, class or group
of workerS' filing claims ; and,

(2)

Whether or not such strike has been fomented by any worker of such grade, class, or
group of workers.
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A strike has been defined quite generally as an act
of quitting work:

'' * * * such an act done by mutual understanding by a body of workmen as a means of enf.or·cing compliance with demands made on their
employer; a stopping of work by workmen in
·O<rder to obtain or resist a change in conditions of
employment.'' Webster's New International Dictiona.ry, Second Edition, Unabridged.
In the case of Restful Slipper Company v. United
Shoe & Leather Union, 174 A. 543, the Chancery Court
of New Jersey, said:
''A strike is cessation of work by employees in an
effort to get for the employees more desirable
terms.''
Was there sufficient e'Vidence presented during the
hearing of July 6, 1939, to reasonably support any finding by the Commission that the stoppage of work in the
bituminous coal industry and more particularly at the
Clear Creek mine of the Company was due to a strike~
We urge that the pr·o1of is positive and uncontradicted that work ceased at midnight May 4, 1939, as a
result of a strike and for no other reason. There is Petitioners' Exhibit "A'', the Agre·ement !between the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 22, and the
Uta1h Goal Operators, to~ which the Petitioners and the
Company were· parties and which by its terms expired
March 31, 1939. 'There is Petitioners' Exhibit "B ", the
Extension of Agreement to which the Petitioners and the
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Company were parties, agreeing that wDrk should continue after March 31, 1939, but. subject t01 termination on
fifteen days' notice.
A perusal of the Extension Agreement quite clearly
indicates that such agreement related to working· conditiDns and wages of the Petitioners: that there were negotiations pending whereby a new wage agreement was
being sought; and that fhe Petitioners as well as the
Company agreed to negotiate a new Utah "\Vage Agreement as soon as the negotiations in the Joint Appalachian
Omference had been concluded.
There is the positive statement by the General Superintendent of the Company that notice of termination
was given by the Union, "* * * formal notification
frDm the union authorities, written notification, that work
would terminate.'' (T. 39)
If corroboration were needed Mr. Carey, official of
the union and representative ·Of the Petitioners, unre-servedly made the admission that notice was served that
the temporary ·Contract, the Extension of Agreement,
would terminate at midnight ~fay 4, 1939, and the further
admission that all productive work in the mine ceased by
reason ·of that order or notice at midnight May 4, 1939.
(T. 11)

All of the elements necessary to constitute proof o.f
a strike are clearly in ·evidence. There was an act of
quitting work done by mutual understanding lby the workmen as a body; such act was a means to obtain a change
in conditions of employment.
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Did the Commission reas·onably conclude that the
strike was fomented by the workers~
The word'' f·oment'' is defined as:

''' * * * to ·cherish or promo1te the growth of,
by excitements; t·o rouse; encourage, instigate."
Webster's New ln1ternational Dictionary, Second
Edition. Unabridged.
The word "foment" as used in Section 5(d) does
not merely refer to a creation of the eonditions of unrest
which conclude in a strike but refers to the act of striking
such as t·he issuance of a notice and the cessation of work
upon such notice. The Commission's determination as
to whether or not there was a. fomentation of a strike is
concerned not with determining whether or not the employing unit may 1have brought ahout the unrest which
resulted in the strike but is concerned with determining
what group ·Or class ·of workers were party to the strike
by participating in the act of quitting upon mutual understanding.
S.ectiorn '5(d) is concerned with the preventing of the
use of the Unemployment Compensation Fund for purposes ·Of financing a stoppage of work br•ought about by
the wo•rkers' determination to use that weapon of laihor
called the ''strike.''
A r·eview of the testimony appHaring in the Tran·Sc:ript of the Hearing of July 6, 1939, clearly indicates
that the act of quitting work was the result of thH mutual
determination of the Petitioners. (T. 11, 59')
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It is urged by Petitioners that ber~1use the determination to terminate the Interim Agreement was made by
the Central Oonnnittee of the United Mine Workers of
Ameriea, the Petitioners had no voiee in the matter. They
assert, "They were ordered. to do so by their International Exeeutive Board apparently beeause of the deadloek in the Central Competitive Area.''
The writers of this brief do not pose as authorities
op the proeedure of the United Mine Workers of America. The -organization is nation-wide and according to
the National Labor R~lations Board, the sole bargaining
agency for all coal miners in the United States. We assume that it is demoeratic in its organization. We know,
in a general way, that their conventions are composed of
a great many delegates from Local unions all over the
United States, at which are elected officers and general
plans are formulated. Prior to the termination of one
labor -contract and before negotiations are begun for
another, the Union Scale Connnittee in charge of such
negotiations, meets to determine the demands to be made
and the course of action to be followed in securing a new
contract embodying the terms sought. Apparently, members of the United Mine Workers of America delegate to
their ·officers practically unlimited powers and authority
for the conduct of negotiations, and have vested a group
of men with full authority to act as shall, in their judgment, seem to the best interests of the memhers.
A complaint from the members that their delegates
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sulting their desires falls rather flat. They, of their own
volition, pla.ced themselves within the powers of their
repres·entatives and it eomes with rather bad grace to
later attempt to hide behind the skirts ·Of innocence and
helplessness.
At Page 18 (Brief of Petitioners) Petitioners raise
a rather novel question. We quote:
''·The next question to be considered is whether
or not employees who have a contractual right
with their employer to terminate a .contract upon
certain conditions become ineligible for unemployment compensation by doing only w:hat their employer has contractually agreed with them that
they might do."
May we first of all point out that the ·original Agreement contained, am.ong other provisions, Section 103
(Petitioners' Exhibit" A''):
''Sec. 103. A joint conference of representatives
of the Utah Coal Operators signatories hereto and
of the International Union, United Mine Workers
of America, shall be held at Salt Lake City, Utah,
March 24, 1939, to consider what revisions, if any,
shall be made in this Agreement as to hours, wages
and conditions of employment.
(a) If a new agreement has not been reached
on or before the ·expiration ·of this contra-ct, the
mines covered by this agreement shall -continue in
operation pending negotiations, or until neg.otia.tions are dis.e;ontinued by either party to the
Agreen1en t.
'' (b) As long as the mines continue in operation
after the expiration· of this contract, and until a
new agreement is rea.ched, the scale of wages,
rules, regulations and working conditions enumerated herein, slhall remain in full force and effect.''
1

'

'
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By the terms of such Agreement Petitioners need not
have terminated their employment pending negotiations
-in fact, the Agreement contemplated the reverse situation.
The workers substituted the terms of tJhe Interim
Agreement (Petitioners' Exhibit" B ") which empowered
the workers to terminate their contractual relationship
with the coal produeers upon the giving of fifteen days'
notice. This act alone may readily be considered as one
of the acts of fomentation by the workers looking toward
the ealling of a strike.
However, let us concede for purposes of this argument that the conditions are purely as stated in the Brief
of Petitioners. Does the fact that a contract exists, permitting termination of the terms of employment, remove
workers from the disqualifications provided by Section
5 (d) f Is a strike any less a strike and a stoppage of
work any less a stoppage of work because intelligent
human beings in their written Agreement have foreseen
their possibility f We think not.
If the reasoning were followed that a stoppage of
work brought about by the workers rbecause their contract
of hire permits them to cease work the provisions of Se~c:
tion 5 (d) would be evaded. We cannot visualize any
contract of hire that does not contemplate a power of
termination. Therefore, we could not visualize, under
the reasoning urged by the petitioners, any circumstances
under which the provisions of Section 5 (d) could ever he
applicable.
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Let us ·even assume that Petitioners' argument is
valid, then what would he the result of Section 5(a) of
tihe Utah law in event the workers determined to cease
employment~

Se·ction 5(a) provides for the disqualification of any
individual foT benefits:
'' (a) For the week in which he has left work
voluntarily without good cause, if so found 1by the
commission, and for not less than ·one or more
than the five next following weeks (in addition to
the waiting period), as determined by the commission according to the -circumstances in each ~case.''
The Petitioners would still be ineligible to receive
benefits for the period ranging from May 4, 1939, through
May 18, 1939. They would be ineligible to receive benefits because they vo-luntarily quit work without good
cause. We do not believe that it would be good
cause for any worker to quit his joib because he seeks a
change in his contract of hire unless the conditions of his
employment ar·e found to be ·extremely undesirable.
Little ·can he submitted for the guidance of this court
in the way of adjudicated cases. Not ·only are Unemployment Compensation laws of very recent origin but the
question of benefit payments during stri~e periods has
only very recently arisen and the state laws under which
such questions may arise are far from uniform. The general coal strike her.ein referred to is ·one ·of the first major
tests of pr·ovisions relating to strik·es. It became the subject of controversy in the so-.called Appalachian Area;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43

h-owever the cjrcumshule.t•s surrounding- the stoppage of
work in that Area were extremely different fr{)m the circumstances existing in Utal1.
In conclusion we submit that the Decision of the
Commission in this matter should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted.

JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General
S. D. HUFFAKER,
Assistant Attorney General
A.M. FERRO,

Special Assistant Attorney
General.
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